On the conference call with reporters, the FDIC official leading the discussion argued that the bids that included no leverage had a maximum bid of 58 percent of the remaining balance of the loan portfolio. 4 Non-recourse loans allow the borrower to cede the collateral of the loans with no other adverse consequences in the event of default. Pavlov and Wachter (2002) argue that if the interest rates on non-recourse loans are too low, then such loans will lead to asset pricing bubbles. Wilson (2009) enrich the deposit insurance fund in expectation. This is because any overpayment for the assets ultimately comes back on the deposit insurance fund, which is both the seller of the asset and the guarantor of the loan used to buy the asset.
In addition, using the standard agency theory approach dating back to Jensen and Meckling (1976) , the author argues that the financial structure of the Legacy Loans
Program may hurt the FDIC as the seller of toxic assets. Krugman 8 and Wilson (2009) argue that the size (in percent terms) of the government equity stake has no direct incentives on the bidding behavior of asset managers. Here the author argues that the large government stake blunts the incentives of the asset manager because they bear 100 percent of the costs of their investments but only get half the rewards in terms of profits.
In addition, the leverage subsidy also blunts the desire of the asset manager to increase the value of the loan portfolio because the leverage often increases the chances that those efforts will not be rewarded in the event of default. A better structure would not subsidize high levels of leverage, and it would eliminate the government's stake entirely.
Such a structure would maximize the return from the FDIC's toxic receivership assets.
Most papers addressing the sale of toxic assets have focused on the sale of toxic assets by institutions outside of receivership. This is in large part because that was how the Emergency Economic Stabilization (EESA) legislation, which authorized the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury to buy $700 billion of troubled assets, was advertised. 
Slicing the toxic pizza
Here we draw up a simplified model of the FDIC's legacy loan transaction in receivership. We will initially assume that the buyer of the asset cannot affect its value, but we relax that assumption in section 4. When the private investor takes leverage, she is buying half of a call option, C 0 . The underlying asset of the call option is the toxic asset, which is worth M 0 in period 0. The strike price of the call option is face value of the debt, which we will denote, F. For simplicity we will assume that there are two (If the F > M H , the private investor has no hope for profit.) Let us focus on the interesting case where
The toxic asset is sliced up into four pieces when it uses the PPIP financial structure: the present value of the debt obligation, PV(F); the private investor's stake, ½ C 0 ; the government's stake, ½ C 0 ; and the guarantee for the bond investors, -P 0 .
The FDIC receives the present value of the debt obligation, PV(F); the payments for equity, C 0 ; and the liability for insuring the non-recourse debt, -P 0 . The liability for insuring the non-recourse debt is a put option with a strike price equal to F. If the underlying toxic assets are worth less than the debt in period one, then the FDIC must pay bond investors the difference between the value of toxic assets in period 1 and the amount promised. The bond insurance is worth the following at maturity: Black and Scholes (1973) argued that a European call option, which cannot be exercised until the expiration date, is a function of a put option, the underlying asset, and a risk-free bond. This put-call parity equation says that the value of the call option is equal to the value of the underlying asset, less the present value of the strike price, plus a put option.
That is,
Inserting equation (3) into equation (1), the reader can easily see that the right-hand side of the equation equals the left-hand side. That is, M 0 = M 0 . Thus, the FDIC is made no more or less rich by selling toxic assets that it owns through the Legacy Loans Program.
Proposition 1

If the buyer of the asset cannot affect the asset's value, the FDIC is no better or worse off in expectation either if it sells through the Legacy Loans Program or if it retains assets that it owns in receivership.
This follows from the discussion above. It is an application of the well known theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958) . While some people would find this news depressing, the author argues that it could have been worse. Both Wilson (2009) and Wilson (2010) argue that the government will be much worse off it tries to buy assets from banks outside of receivership using the Legacy Loans Program! Thus, at least when employing the PPIP on receivership assets, taxpayers and the FDIC are no worse off.
While the pie slicing doesn't make the pie bigger, it may make the FDIC look better to the bean counters in the short run. Since the guarantee, the put, will not be exercised for many years down the road, the FDIC can use the inflated sales price of M =M 0 + P 0 to convince Congress of their prudent stewardship of the deposit insurance
fund. Yet, the hidden liability of -P 0 lurks at some point in the future. Since the FDIC needs a loan to cover shortfalls in the deposit insurance fund, it may find the prospect of these inflated prices somewhat attractive. As of mid-September 2009, the FDIC had a $500 billion line of credit with the U.S. Treasury and is exploring other funding mechanisms such as a special assessment, or tax on member banks, or issuing its own debt. 11 Yet, it could reduce its shortfall by selling these derivatives, loan guarantees, which are not unlike credit default swaps. Given the American public's introduction to credit default swaps with the failed insurer, which was undid by its credit default swap exposure, American International Group (AIG), lawmakers and FDIC officials might be wary of the credit default swaps by another name that are boosting the prices in Legacy Loan Program auctions.
Cutting your losses or going long
While in expectation the FDIC is no better or worse off from the sales of the toxic assets, it may do better by trading its assets for cash if things go badly. Alternatively, if things go well it could be better off it maintains a long position in the toxic assets. One of the longest positions that the FDIC could have would involve not selling slices of the toxic pizza. If the FDIC keeps all the slices for itself, it has the most to gain if the mortgages perform better than expected. A bearish FDIC would prefer to sell the equity stakes to third parties, the private investor and the U.S. Treasury. That would allow it to pocket the cash from the equity sales and the sale of the guaranteed note. Yet, it is still exposed to the guarantee for the note if things go badly. In this bad scenario, at least the FDIC keeps the equity that the private investor and taxpayers wished that they still had.
Private investors have better incentives
It seems a safe bet that a private investor will be more motivated to maximize the value of the loan portfolio than FDIC officials. Thus, the toxic asset sale is more than slicing the pie. It may be making the pie bigger. In this section, we will lean on some of the basic insights of managerial motivation and financial structure laid out by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . We assume that the manager can make some non-contractible investments in period 0 just after winning the bidding for the asset. An FDIC official managing the portfolio has no direct financial stake in its success. Thus, he would put forth the minimal effort to increase the toxic assets' value from M 0 . Suppose that the manager can exert some effort to work out the loan portfolio prior to its value's being revealed. Thus, the value of the loan portfolio can be raised by αm > 0 with certainty at a cost to the manager of ½ m 2 . Alpha, α, reflects the skill that the manager has in working out the toxic assets and raising the value of the portfolio. If M L + αm < F the manager only gets paid for her efforts the fraction of the time, 0 < q < 1, that the loan portfolio does well. That is when M 1 = M H . Alternatively, all the benefits from her efforts go to the FDIC-the guarantor of the debt-if she defaults on the non-recourse debt. Further, since the asset manager must split the equity with the government, she only gets rewarded for half her efforts when the loans perform better than expected. In that case, the manager chooses the effort according to the following program:
This clearly has a maximum value implied by the first order condition with respect to m. This maximum ism = ½ αq. If the manager could have bought 100 percent of the equity in the toxic asset, then she would maximize qαm -½ m 2 , and the resulting optimal level of effort would be . m qα ′ = Thus, the 50/50 equity structure of the PPIP actually prevents the asset manager from maximizing the value of portfolio.
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With the 50/50 equity split, the value of the toxic asset rose from M 0 to M 0 + ½ qα. In the second case, where the asset manager had a 100 percent equity stake, the toxic asset has risen to M 0 + qα. We can do even better if the winning bidder chooses a level of leverage F such that F < M L + αm. In that case, the manager is always rewarded for her efforts, and she maximizes αm -½ m 2 . The resulting optimal level of effort is m
Thus, the value of the loan portfolio would be maximized at M 0 + α if both the maximum level of leverage was F < M L + α and the manager buys a 100 percent equity stake.
The loan guarantee may be worth more than the increase in value due to managerial investments. Suppose that the toxic asset manager chooses the maximum leverage and use her efforts to increase the value of the loans by ˆ. That is because the loan guarantee, which we will denote as 0 , P inflates the highly levered bidder's purchase price. With this maximum leverage, the loan guarantee is worth
then the manager that wins the bidding will take on too much leverage to maximize the value of the loan portfolio. Too much leverage causes the toxic asset manager to exert less effort when working out the troubled loans. This is because she is only rewarded for her efforts when times are good if she chooses leverage to maximize the value of the loan guarantee. Yet, she defaults when times are bad and thus none of her efforts are rewarded. Thus, the perverse result of the loan guarantees being offered is that the winning bidder may have less incentive to maximize the value of the loan portfolio.
The deposit insurance fund as the owner of the toxic assets in receivership only can receive the value of the toxic assets it is selling. We know the inflated price due to the loan guarantee is offset by an equal liability to the deposit insurance fund. Yet, the increase in value of the loan portfolio due to the private investor's higher level of effort managing the asset does increase the value of the asset to the FDIC. If the FDIC sets up a bidding process where the highest bidder will not maximize the value of the toxic asset, then it is the FDIC that ultimately suffers because it only receives M 0 + ½ qα from its toxic asset sales in the long-run. This is clearly less than the value it could have received, M 0 + α , without offering loan guarantees and forcing the asset manager to accept less than 100 percent of the project's equity.
This discussion leads us to the following proposition: 
The expected value of the loan portfolio is $56, but there is a fifty-fifty chance that the portfolio will be worth $28 when things go bad and $84 when things go well.
Further, for simplicity we will assume that the risk-free rate of interest is 0.
The maximum amount that the asset manager is willing to bid is . M The asset manager is buying half the call option, ½ C 0 . With 6-to-1 leverage and a 50 percent government equity stake, this call option is worth (½)(1/7) or one-fourteenth of the purchase price, ½ C 0 = (1/14) . M Further, when the non-recourse debt, F, exceeds the value of the portfolio in the low demand state, the call option is only exercised in the high demand scenario. Thus,
This debt is a function of the purchase price.
In particular, (6 / 7) . M We can simplify the relationship, ½ C 0 = ½ q(M H -(6 / 7)M ) =
(1/14) . M Namely, the maximum price that the asset manager is willing to pay in a competitive auction is 6 1 7 7
In this example, plugging in the parameters in equation ( 
Slices affect the asset manager's incentives
Personally, the author thinks that the whole rationale for selling the receivership assets to private investors is that the FDIC is not really skilled at managing them. (I don't think officials at the FDIC would disagree with this assessment.) Thus, the asset manager brings some skills or manpower that the FDIC lacks or is poorly motivated to employ.
Suppose the manager has a skill parameter of α = $10. Thus, the asset manager is motivated to raise the value of the portfolio by ˆ0.5 $2.50 m qα = = if she has a fifty percent stake and chooses the maximum leverage. This is the structure proposed by the U.S. Treasury, which was used in the first LLP auction. Yet, if there is still subsidized leverage but no government equity stake, then the asset manager will raise the value of the portfolio by $5. m qα ′ = = Alternatively, if the manger is neither accepting a government equity stake nor receiving a debt guarantee from the FDIC, she would take on debt less than or equal to M L = $28, and she would raise the value of the loan portfolio by m * = $10. Thus, the loan portfolio could be worth M 0 + m * = $66 in period zero. That extra $10 in long-run value could be pocketed by the FDIC in a competitive auction process, because it is the owner of the receivership assets.
Yet, the financial structure of the PPIP makes the winning bidder choose maximum leverage. Thus, plugging in the parameter values into equation (5) While the FDIC collects $75.6875 in period 0 with the 6-to-1 leverage, it can only expect to have $75.6875 -$17.1875 = $58.50 in period 1. In contrast, with no leverage subsidy and no government ownership stake, the FDIC could expect to collect $66 in period 0 and keep all that money in period 1. In short, the Public Private Investment Partnership's financial structure leads to an inefficient allocation of receivership assets. It awards loan portfolios to managers who have the least incentive to maximize the toxic assets' value.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that the structure of the Legacy Loans Program (LLP) auctions of toxic assets in receivership at best does not matter. The auction prices will be boosted by the subsidized leverage, but the FDIC incurs an offsetting loan guarantee liability that cancels out any gain from the increased purchase price. At worst, the current structure of subsidized leverage discourages the winning bidder from maximizing the value of the loan portfolios. Thus, the FDIC may benefit from ending the loan guarantees. The excessive leverage brought by subsidized loan guarantees coupled with the public's ownership stake, may be discouraging the ultimate buyers from maximizing the value of toxic asset portfolios. This paper finds that abandoning subsidized government financing may benefit the deposit insurance fund in the long run even if it leads to lower sale prices of receivership assets in the short-run.
